Officer Rot in the Unites States Air Force
Here’s an interesting read we found recently posted on Robert Avrech’s web site. Apparently, it’s from a current, active duty Air Force officer. That makes it all the more interesting. It’s pretty easy to sit on the outside of a military service and carp about these kinds of issues. It’s equally easy to question this writer’s angle. But, as he mentions here, careerism is an age old problem in the military and when it happens, someone needs to point it out. I think some time ago a guy named Billy Mitchell did just that. Well, maybe it’s back.
Introduction
First I'd like to thank Robert for the opportunity to scribble on his page. When you have a writer as accomplished as Robert asking you to fill space on his website... well, that's quite an honor. I'll do my best not to wreck the place.
Robert and I frequently talk military. And as I'm sure you readers already know, Robert is no slouch when it comes to the art of war. Though I grew up a Navy brat, got my degree in military history from an Army college, serve in the USAF, and generally think I know it all, Robert's knowledge frequently humbles me.
Which is why I'm grateful for the opportunity to relay this extension of a chat we had on the general state of things in the USAF.
—A U.S. Air Force Officer
Marshall's Men*
First, a little history lesson on one of the towering figures of the 20th Century, General George C. Marshall.
General George C. Marshall (1880 – 1959). Churchill dubbed Marshall “the organizer of victory”. In truth, Marshall made the ally victory inevitable before the war by ridding the army of officers who were wedded to static World War I tactics, and replacing them with officers who understood that the next war would be fast-paced, mobile, and highly mechanized.You see, it wasn't Patton's tanks or Hap Arnold's bombers or Nimitz's Navy that won World War II. It was a commandant at the Fort Benning Infantry school in the 1930s, then Lt. Col. Marshall, who won the war before it even started.
The US Army in the 1930s was in a sad state of affairs (though the depression was raging, and everything was in a sad state of affairs). But the Army's plague transcended supply issues. After World War I, careerism started to take its heavy toll on the force. Generals advanced cronies who walked like them, talked like them, and thought like them. Those men in turn advanced subordinates who fit their image and likeness, and so the process went.
Think of it as a sort of incestuous breeding process for military leadership.
By the time the mid-1930s rolled around, the Japanese were building carriers and the Nazis were building Tigers and the U.S. Army still training their infantry to fight in trenches and out of static defenses as per the hideous World War I model. We saw which ideology won in 1940. Ever hear of the Maginot Line?
Marshall cleaned shop. He burned the old Infantry School curriculum to the ground and built a new lesson plan out of scratch. The inbred offspring of the careerist generals who fought to defend their old bosses' curriculum were simply removed and replaced. And in what should be the most famous little black book in history, Marshall logged the names of officers who understood that the next war would be a rapid, fast-paced conflict fought largely with war machines.
Unfortunately, such change comes at a high cost. Bureaucracies are marked by men who stake out chunks of territory and guard their acquisitions ferociously. The 1930s US Army was no different. What was later called “The Benning Revolution” landed Marshall little praise and a lot of enemies.
So when Brigadier General Marshall was appointed Assistant Chief of Staff in 1938 (another famous General, a John "Black Jack" Pershing got him there), he figured he was at the end of the road. General Aloysius Drum would take over for Malin Craig as Chief of Staff, and Marshall—now out of allies—would be quietly retired.
This, fortunately, was not to be. An influential adviser to President Roosevelt recognized Marshall's potential and spent a year whispering into FDR's ear. Per presidential directive, Marshall was advanced to Chief of Staff of the Army in 1939. He was sworn in on September 1st, 1939.
One of Marshall's first order of business was purifying the War Department. Generals were fired. Over 100 colonels retired. The black book materialized, and men—Marshall's Men—were appointed in their steads. Marshall was criticized by Congress for bankrupting the Army of it's "brains." Six years later, there were no complaints. Some of the men promoted under George C. Marshall included Joseph Stillwell, Omar Bradley, Hap Arnold, George Patton, and Dwight Eisenhower—a colonel on Marshall's staff a scant three years before taking his post as Supreme Allied Commander.
Marshall's little black book won the war. And it etched in history a lesson that should never be forgotten...
Peacetime leaders make horrible wartime leaders.
It's a generalization, but a generalization that's generally true.
Officer Rot Sets In
Enter today's United States Air Force. The plague of peacetime bureaucracy has set in, and it's set in hard. “Officer rot” is what Robert dubbed it, and I can't think of a better term to describe the disease. Officers are advanced in a system that awards those who clog the service's pipes with new and excessive regulations. Simplicity and speed are downplayed in favor of safer methodologies.
And “safe” is really the word of the day. On my base, the Wing Commander emphasizes—above all else—how DUIs and vehicle accidents are a few notches below the historical average. Commanders are reprimanded if one of their Airman suffers from—God forbid—an accident. The mentality has become so perverse that the Air Force actually seems to believe its leaders capable of preventing accidents from even happening.
Smart people realize that accidents are a statistical certainty.
The Air Force does not.
Now that's a very specific example of a larger problem. And the problem is this: Air Force careerists have made risk aversion their number one priority. "Who dares, wins" has gone the way of the Dodo. Airman and their officers are forced to memorize the Six Steps of Operational Risk Management and are expected to apply to every decision they make, so that risk may be avoided at all cost. Not unnecessary risk, mind-you. Risk. Period.
Risk aversion, as many thinking types know, is a horrible trait in an officer and a leader. World War II was marked by an innovation in military thinking never seen before in the US Military—except when Confederates Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson were engineering innovative ways to kill Union soldiers. Today's Air Force, sans a primary purpose and an identifiable peer competitor, is not forced to think outside the box. In fact, they are so far in the box they probably couldn't find a way out if they tried.
You see it in the news every day. When was the last positive news story that you read about the USAF? It's all negative. How bureaucratic missteps send them down the path of weapons procurement hell. How they banked the future of the service on six-hundred F-22 Raptors, and are now stuck with one-hundred and eighty-five. How the other services are off fighting while the Air Force flies overhead, gobbling resources for hyper-expensive technological weapon platforms while the Army and Marines scream for more armor. And so it goes.Caught Up in the Wars of Old
When I think of officer rot, I think about Air Force careerists trying to get rid of the A-10 Warthog—arguably the greatest close air support platform ever—in favor of a fast-moving Joint Strike Fighter.They are so caught up in the wars of old, may God help us if the Chinese make good on their threats to reunify with Taiwan, or if Putin brings back the Russian Empire, or if Kim Jong Il decides he wants a bungalow in Seoul.
I'm an Air Force man and I'm telling it to you as plain as I can. We're screwed. Donezo. Kaput.
Pity, as the USAF would be our front line against any of those scenarios.
The Air Force needs a George C. Marshall. Oh, do they need a Marshall. Someone who gets it. Someone who has the stones to tank a generation of officers who just aren't helping. Someone who understands how to communicate the service's needs, what it can bring to the fight—the Air Force's abilities are unmatched—and someone who will rediscover the service's purpose: to support the infantry.
And I suppose to deter peer/near peer adversaries as well.
But as Marshall said, “The chariot, the longbow, the airplane... all wars in history have been decided by the man standing on the smoking battlefield with a sword in hand.”
Just so. The Air Force exists to support the infantry.
Careerist Air Force officers have it in their head that the infantry supports the Air Force. If you can think of a better way to describe that than rot, I'm all ears.
Don't get me wrong though, folks. When the sun sets I still love my blue suit and love the sound of thundering jets overhead. Love it. But that's why it pains me so much to see a once-proud service fall into disrepair and irrelevance because of cowardly leaders who value their own stinkin' promotions over the good of the service and the good of the country. Some are well-intentioned. Most are just plain arrogant. I see both types every day. It pains me.
And I want it to stop.
*Marhall's Men
General Joseph Stillwell (1883 – 1946), best known for his service in Burma and China, Stillwell was nicknamed "Vinergar Joe" because of his blunt honesty. This harsh manner landed Stillwell in political trouble with President Roosevelt when Stillwell repeatedly clashed with America's ally the corrupt Chinese Nationalist General Chiang Kai Chek.
General Omar Bradley (1893 – 1981) was one of the main U.S. Army field commanders in North Africa and Europe during World War II. Journalist Ernie Pyle dubbed Bradley "the soldier's general." Bradley was incredibly polite and unassuming—unlike the more colorful Patton—and never issued an order without saying 'Please' first."
General Henry "Hap" Arnold, (1886 – 1950) General of the Air Force. The Wright Brothers taught him how to fly. Arnold was one of the first military pilots worldwide. Believe it or not, Arnold suffered from fear of flying early in his career and had to work hard to overcome this phobia. So far, Arnold is the only American to achieve five-star rank in two of its armed services.
General George Patton (1885– 1945). His insistence on aggressive, offensive style combat reflected his deeply held belief that tanks are the Cavalry of modern warfare. Profane, religious, and deeply mystical Patton was a walking mass of contradictions. With all his personal faults, Patton was a tactical genius.
General Dwight "Ike" Eisenhower (1890 – 1969) impressed General George Marshall, U.S. Chief of Staff, and a week after Pearl Harbor was recruited to help prepare the plans for war with Japan and Germany. Appointed Supreme Commander of the Allied forces in Europe, Eisenhower shouldered responsibility for planning and supervising the massive and costly invasion of France and Germany.
*Marhall's Men
General Joseph Stillwell (1883 – 1946), best known for his service in Burma and China, Stillwell was nicknamed "Vinergar Joe" because of his blunt honesty. This harsh manner landed Stillwell in political trouble with President Roosevelt when Stillwell repeatedly clashed with America's ally the corrupt Chinese Nationalist General Chiang Kai Chek.General Omar Bradley (1893 – 1981) was one of the main U.S. Army field commanders in North Africa and Europe during World War II. Journalist Ernie Pyle dubbed Bradley "the soldier's general." Bradley was incredibly polite and unassuming—unlike the more colorful Patton—and never issued an order without saying 'Please' first."General Henry "Hap" Arnold, (1886 – 1950) General of the Air Force. The Wright Brothers taught him how to fly. Arnold was one of the first military pilots worldwide. Believe it or not, Arnold suffered from fear of flying early in his career and had to work hard to overcome this phobia. So far, Arnold is the only American to achieve five-star rank in two of its armed services.General George Patton (1885– 1945). His insistence on aggressive, offensive style combat reflected his deeply held belief that tanks are the Cavalry of modern warfare. Profane, religious, and deeply mystical Patton was a walking mass of contradictions. With all his personal faults, Patton was a tactical genius.General Dwight "Ike" Eisenhower (1890 – 1969) impressed General George Marshall, U.S. Chief of Staff, and a week after Pearl Harbor was recruited to help prepare the plans for war with Japan and Germany. Appointed Supreme Commander of the Allied forces in Europe, Eisenhower shouldered responsibility for planning and supervising the massive and costly invasion of France and Germany.
Maybe some of you are familiar with a past case from some years ago in which another “anonymous” fighter pilot posted on the net a similar piece that excoriated the granite brained thinking of our then “careerist” senior leadership (puke!) in TAC responsible for the bankrupt ideas driving fighter doctrine, training and fighter procurement that held that “the merge” would never happen again and that future fighter pilots had only to have brains capable of computer like processing in order to “play the piccolo” to be able to ID, lock-up, track, and engage 20 bandits simultaneously at BVR ranges of 100 miles plus with .18 PK missiles at Mach 3 in level flight never exceeding 30 degrees of bank. That “anonymous” fighter pilot made the mistake of dropping a few hints to establish his credentials about being an asst opso with time in several different fighters and two SEA tours which was just enough for one of our then rock brained, pathetic senior leaders to task a hqs personnel type E-9 to cull thru mountains of personnel records to identify him.
Needless to say, he was crucified and never flew another AF fighter again. Keep up the good work!
“Crank”
PS (Just in case you’re wondering, my own FP credentials include time in F-4s, A1Hs in SEA, and just enough time in the F-15 to decide that I never wanted to become proficient in playing a piccolo!)
Boyd was right, there should be more people concerned with "doing" as opposed to "being".
The A/G machines might need some protection from enemy fighters over and above the A10's survivabilty in the maws of ground gun barrels and SAMs. The fast movers can also interdict or assist in interdicting the enemy far behind the FEBA, by far the fast movers' contribution to the ground battle, WHICH MUST BE THEIR MOTIVATION AND STOCK IN TRADE. The Army boots on the ground will finish off the job with the assistance of other military organizations, Navy included. Fast movers are not prima donnas as you imply, but without them no battle would go well. NG